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Recent research indicates that the majority of listed firms in Germany (and also in many other 
countries around the world) have a dominant owner rather than being widely-held. Hence, 
owner-dominated firms comprise an important subset of listed companies. This article introduces 
the concept of an ownership-based style index of listed firms in Germany, the German 
Entrepreneurial Index (GEX
®). Introduced in 2005, the GEX
® represents recently listed, owner-
dominated firms in the German Prime Standard. We review the theoretical foundation and the 
index construction of the GEX
®. In addition, we provide an overview of its development and 
performance between index inception and end of 2008 and relate this to properties of the German 
financial market. Finally, we conclude with a critical outlook for the index future against the 
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I.  Introduction 
 
In early 2005, Deutsche Börse supplemented its index family by the German Entrepreneurial 
Index (GEX
®), which had been developed by the Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial 
Studies (CEFS) at the Technische Universität München (TUM) for Deutsche Börse.
1 The GEX
® 
measures the performance of all owner-dominated German companies that are listed in the Prime 
Standard
2 of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and whose IPO or first quotation of its common stock 
occurred at most ten years ago. As a style index, the GEX
® markedly differs in its construction 
from the existing indices of Deutsche Börse and other institutions. This article wants to explain 
the motivation for the introduction of the index, its construction criteria, and provide a comment 
on its development during the first four years while relating this to properties of the German 
financial market.  
 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section II gives an overview about the 
motivation and the theoretical foundation for the GEX
®, section III explains the construction 
criteria of the index and puts it in context to the German index family of Deutsche Börse. Section 
IV analyses changes in and development of the index composition. Section V analyzes the past 
performance in comparison to other indices of Deutsche Börse, while section VI provides a short 
conclusion based on our findings. 
 




® is motivated based on (i) empirical findings for the relationship between shareholder 
structure and corporate performance and (ii) characteristics of entrepreneurial firms.  
  
1. Ownership structure and corporate performance 
During the past 25 years, agency theory has supplied important explanations for the fact that 
ownership structure is an important determinant of corporate performance. For the analysis of the 
relationship between shareholders and management, the manager-owner conflict (agency conflict 
I) and the majority-minority shareholder conflict (agency conflict II) have become the two 
decisive paradigms.  
Regarding the agency conflict I, the behavior of sallared managers (the agent) cannot be 
sufficiently controlled by the shareholders (the principals) for a variety of reasons. Salaried 
managers retain a non-negligible scope for increasing their own benefits at the expense of the 
                                            
1   The index-calculation of the GEX
® 
and the related real-time distribution of GEX
®
 index levels by 
Deutsche Börse officially started on January 3, 2005. The concept was first introduced to the public at 
the Deutsche Eigenkapitalforum in Frankfurt/Main, Germany, on November 23, 2004.  
2   The Prime Standard is the stock market segment on the regulated market of the Frankfurt stock 
exchange with the highest transparency requirements. For further information see p. 11.   4
shareholders.
3 Of course, the latter will anticipate such exploitation potential. This is why, over 
time, mechanisms have been developed by financial markets to reduce the welfare costs of these 
agency conflicts.  A distinction is frequently made between mechanisms of internal and external 
corporate governance. Among the former are, in particular, the activities of the supervisory 
board, like setting the top management’s compensation, whereas the latter comprises the 
activities of investors in financial markets. In recent years, however, the empirical literature has 
supplied ample evidence for the, at least partial, failure of these mechanisms.
4 A prominent 
example is stock options. Meanwhile, various findings have shown that their growth is rather due 
to a failure of corporate governance than due to the implementation of compensation structures 
that are in the interest of the shareholders.
5 Thus, today’s corporate governance debate may also 
be understood as a discussion of the deficiencies and possible improvements of these 
mechanisms. The importance of a functioning corporate governance structure becomes even 
more prominent during the course of the current financial crisis. In this context, Lo (2009) states 
very clearly that in the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008 the lack of independence between risk and 
reward in the corporate governance structure is of high concern. This lack caused agency 




In theory, managerial ownership is one possibility to improve the inducement effects on 
management. If this mechanism works, the interests between shareholders and management are 
aligned and firm’s capital costs are expected to decline. In contrast, managerial entrenchment can 
counteract the effect of reducing the cost of capital mentioned before. The cost of capital rises 
due to lacking diversification of idiosyncratic risks when ownership is concentrated.
7 This effect 
can be reinforced if the owner is subject to funding constraints that prevent him from raising 
equity necessary for new investments, which otherwise would result in an undesired reduction of 
his ownership stake.  
 
Even supposing that, given these two opposing effects, the first one dominates as a rule, there are 
good reasons why an increase in management’s equity position does not result in a reduction of 
the cost of capital. It is likely that this effect will be working when the equity ratios are initially 
rather low; as equity ratios rise, however, management will increasingly act like majority 
shareholders. This raises new problems which in the literature are subsumed under the agency 
                                            
3   Among the important contributions in this context are Berle/Means(1932) and Jensen/Meckling (1976), 
pp. 305 ff. 
4   On this issue see the fundamental contribution of Jensen (1993), pp. 831 ff. A survey of the 
deficiencies of corporate governance in Germany is contained in Wenger/Kaserer (1998), pp. 499-536. 
There has been a large debate on corporate governance in the aftermath of several corporate scandals 
during the last decade (such as Enron, Worldcome or Parmalat). For evidence on recent changes in 
corporate governance in Continental Europe cf. Enriques and Volpin (2007).  
5   See Bebchuk/Fried (2004). Kaserer/Wagner (2004) show that introduction of share options has 
reduced the dependence of executive compensation on performance in Germany. 
6   See Lo (2009), p. 36. 
7   This effect is weakened if the owner includes in his estimate a sale of the firm in the foreseeable future.   5
conflict II between majority and minority shareholders. Such constellations may have the 
undesirable consequence that the major shareholder exploits the scope for corporate action at the 
expense of the minority shareholders.
8 It should also be considered that with management’s 
rising equity ownership the corrective effects of the labor market and the market for corporate 
control will increasingly be weakened because the manager/owner is protected against dismissal 
and the company is protected against acquisition. Although there might be an optimal ownership 
structure from a theoretical point of view (where agency costs from both agency conflicts are 
minimised), we know very little about how to determine it.  
 
The interesting empirical question is to which extent there is a relationship between managerial 
ownership and the firm value. Among the most important papers is without any doubt that of 
Morck/Shleifer/Vishny (1988),
9 who show that there is a non-monotonous relationship between 
managerial ownership and the value of the firm as measured by Tobin’s Q. Starting from 
managerial ownership of zero, the value of the firm initially rises with increasing managerial 
share ownership, only to fall later. The seminal work by Morck/Shleifer/Vishny (1988) was just 
the starting point for a large strand of literature dealing with the relationship between shareholder 
structure and corporate performance. Although evidence for the impact of insider ownership is 
mixed, the majority of studies assume that the incentive alignment effects dominate the 
entrenchment effects of insider ownership.
10  
Due to the potential reverse causality between insider ownership and corporate performance 
more recent studies deal primarily with the performance of family-managed companies.
11 One 
reason for this is that studies have shown that in many countries a large fraction of firms are 
family firms. Also, the methodological problem of endogeneity is not as prominent as it is for 
insider dominated firms: The existence of a founding family within a firm can influence the 
performance, and not vice versa. Within that strand of literature there seems to be a consensus 
that family firms show a superior performance especially if the founder is still present in firm 
                                            
8   Hecker (2000). 
9   Morck/Shleifer/Vishny (1988), pp. 293, ff. 
10 For a review of this literature, see Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). As discussed in Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), the aspect whether endogeneity between shareholder structure and performance 
affects the results is addressed to a different degree across various studies. For a discussion on the 
endogeneity of ownership structures see e.g. Himmelberg/Hubbard/Palia (1999), p. 357-360 or 
Demsetz (1985). A more recent approach is to analyse the impact of changes in managerial ownership 
on corporate performance as for example in Fahlenbrach (2009). This approach is intended to reduce 
concerns of endogeneity. 
11 Although the definitions of a family-managed company used in these studies vary, their common 
denominator is that they are based on the share ownership of the founding family – quite distinct from 
the GEX
® definition of owner-managed firms. Many of the GEX
® firms may, however, also be family 
firms in the above sense.   6
management.
12 As Kaserer/Moldenhauer (2008) have shown there exists a relationship between 
owner dominance and performance in Germany.
13 Overall, it is likely that notable insider 
ownership  has positive effects on corporate performance.
14  
This fact might pose an opportunity for an investment strategy. But one should keep in mind, 
however, that it is not the function of an index to define an investment strategy. Rather, it has an 
information, a benchmarking, an investment, and a trade function. These aspects were of central 
importance in the construction of the GEX
®. The criterion of owner dominance is to be seen 
primarily against this background. The fact that there are empirically founded reasons for a long-
term out-performance of owner-managed companies suggests the construction of a 
corresponding index. In the final analysis, it is a question of the investment decision of the 
investors whether they presume such a relationship. Independently of this, the construction of a 
corresponding index makes sense as long as its information and trade functions are not 
redundant.  
 
2. Limited post-IPO age 
Since companies only remain in the GEX
® for a limited period of time – at a maximum of ten 
years – the index illustrates the performance of owner-managed firms for a limited period only. 
Entrepreneurial firms according to the index are defined as owner-managed firms during this ten 
year period. One could argue that length of this ten year period is arbitrary but to determine this 
period, the phase of the firm ought to be identified in which it is in transition from a newly listed 
firm to becoming a mature listed company. Although there are no relevant definitions for this, the 
issuance of equity and significant changes in capital and ownership structure were identified to 
be the prime economic characteristics of this transition phase. Our empirical research shows that 
during the first ten years after their IPO, German firms increase their equity by an average 120%, 
whereas in the ensuing five years the average capital increase amounts to only 20% (see Fig. 1). 
For many firms, stock listing is therefore the beginning of an intensive growth phase,
15 in which 
                                            
12  See among others the studies of Anderson/Reeb (2003), Villalonga/Amit (2006), Fahlenbrach (2008) 
for the U.S., Claessens et al. (2002) for several southeast Asian countries, Cronquist/Nilson (2003) for 
Sweden, Gorriz/Fumas (2005) for Spain, Ehrhardt/Nowak/Weber (2004) or Andres (2008) for 
Germany, Sraer/Thesmar (2006) for France, Bloom/Van Reenen (2007) for France, Germany, Great 
Britain and the U.S. as well as Barontini/Caprio (2006) for Europe. However, please note that the 
comparability of studies in this area is rather limited due i.a. to national differences, different definitions 
(e.g. the definition of a family firm), and different research emphases. In addition, the aspect whether 
endogeneity between shareholder structure and corporate performance affects the results is again 
addressed in the cited studies to a different degree. 
13  Kaserer/Moldenhauer (2008). 
14  This finding is also supported by two studies focussing on newly listed firms: Ehrhardt/Nowak (2003), p. 
229, show that the average rate of return over a period of 36 months after the IPO is 6.5% for 
companies in which the family still controls 25% to 75% of the voting rights. In contrast, the paper of 
Stehle/Ehrhardt/Przyborowsky (2000), pp. 173-196, shows that over the same post-IPO period the 
average rate of return of all German IPOs, including family and non-family firms  was only -5.04%. 
Based on the t-values mentioned in both studies, it must be assumed that there is no statistically 
significant difference between these two findingsThese findings support to consider newly listed and 
insider dominated firms in an index like the GEX
®. 
15  Of course, the increase in equity can also be triggered by a restructuring of the liability side. But then 
the company is also in a special transition phase.   7
the transition from a purely owner-dominated entrepreneurial firm to an established public 
corporation takes place.  
 





























































During this transition phase not only the capital structure but also the ownership structure of the 
firm frequently changes substantially. This development is not least triggered by the fact that 
shareholders on the management board do not fully participate in seasoned equity offerings for 
example because they want to achieve a better diversification of their private assets. As a 
consequence, external investors must subsequently contribute equity to the entrepreneurial firm. 
The analysis by Ehrhardt/Nowak (2003) of the IPOs of 105 family firms in Germany between 
January 1970 and December 1990 shows that the share of 98.2% held by the founding family 
before the IPO declines to 77.1% at the time of the IPO, to 57.9% five years later and to 40.4% 
ten years later.
16  At the same time, the equity share of new major shareholders rises to an 
average of 33% (17%) by the end of the ten-year (five-year) period.  
These figures support that – at least with respect to family firms – there is indeed a substantial 
change in ownership structure within ten years after the IPO. Typically, the family has lost the 
majority of voting rights at the end of this period, and it has to deal with a new major shareholder 
who often has a blocking minority stake. In this respect, this period may well be described as a 
                                            
16 Ehrhardt/Nowak (2003), p. 227.  8
transition phase and used as a defining element of an entrepreneurial firm.
17 The findings of Fig. 
1 further support limiting this transition phase to ten years, although this period is in fact 
arbitrary.  
Completely giving up this criterion would naturally limit the representativeness of the GEX
® with 
respect to the group of entrepreneurial firms.  It should be noted that giving up the criterion of 
post-IPO age would mean that as of 30.12.2008, with BMW, Fresenius Medical Care, Henkel, 
Metro, SAP, Thyssenkrupp and Volkswagen, a total of seven DAX companies, would be 
additionally represented in the GEX
®. Even given the present ceiling of 10% for the weight of an 
individual stock, these companies would greatly dominate the GEX
®, so that it would no longer 
be an index of entrepreneurial firms. 
 
3. Different functions of a stock index and assessment for GEX
® 
 
As mentioned before, stock indices fulfill different functions: information, benchmark, trading 
and investment.
18  
The aggregation of individual price changes permits the market actors to get a quick overview of 
the market and to reduce their information costs. In this sense, the GEX
® provides an overview of 
owner-managed, entrepreneurial firms in the German stock market which were hardly noticed in 
Germany before the introduction of the index.  
In portfolio management, stock indices also assume a benchmarking function, serving as the 
reference portfolio for institutional investors pursuing an active investment strategy.
19 According 
to its design, the GEX
®  could also serve as a benchmark. Furthermore, management and 
investors of owner-managed companies that are not yet listed, could also make use of the 
performance of listed entrepreneurial firms as an important measure of comparison. Finally, it 
should be noted that the GEX
® performance represents an important indicator of the present stock 
market environment of SMEs. Such an indicator could be important especially for private equity 
firms that want to sell their investments via an IPO. To illustrate the importance of the GEX
® as a 
benchmark for private equity firms, we analyzed the ownership structure before and after the IPO 
for a sample of 63 GEX
® firms based on the index composition after one year.
20 At that point of 
time almost half of the sample (28 firms or 44.4%) was financed by private equity firms before 
                                            
17  It should be noted that besides ownership structure firm age can have a significant impact on corporate 
performance. In fact, Loderer and Waechli (2009) argue that corporate performance is decreasing in 
firm age. Based on a large database they show that in the U.S. comparatively young firms show the 
best corporate performance. Firms start underperforming the median industry firm roughly 37 years 
after their incorporation and fifteen years after their IPO. Thereby, performance is measured by Tobin’s 
Q. Cf. Loderer and Waechli (2009).  
18  On the functions of stock indices see Schmitz-Esser (2001), pp. 15-98. 
19  On active and passive investment strategies see e.g. Bruns/Meyer-Bullerdiek (2001), pp. 104-126. 
20  See Kaserer/Achleitner/Moldenhauer/Ampenberger (2006).  9
the IPO. Since the performance of an index allows to draw conclusions on the current valuation 
at the capital market, the GEX
® provides indications for the timing of an IPO.
21  
When the GEX
® was introduced in January 2005, a trading function of the index was already 
considered as an opportunity to be developed, but was not clearly delineated from its information 
and benchmarking function. If it is taken into account that many indices have no direct trading 
function, this intention is in no way uncommon. In the context of the trading function, stock 
indices serve as the basis for derivatives by which the index portfolio, i.e. the stocks comprising 
the index, becomes tradable in a transaction.
22 Despite the original focus on the information and 
benchmarking functions, the first certificates and options based on the GEX
® were offered and 
traded only two days after the GEX




For investors with a passive investment strategy stock indices serve as benchmark portfolios. In 
this context, stock indices assume an investment function. Even if the GEX
® as reference index 
does not determine the investment decisions of institutional or private investors, the question 
poses itself to which extent entrepreneurial firms represent an asset class of their own
24 that helps 
investors diversify their risk and optimize their asset allocation.
25 In technical terms one can say 
that from the perspective of portfolio theory the formation of different asset classes only makes 
sense if the combination of N financial assets in the investment universe to K≤ N subgroups 
permits the same risk efficient portfolio combinations as a direct combination of the N financial 
assets.
26 This is only possible if there are linear dependencies among or linear combinations of 
the financial assets. Since such constellations occur at best in exceptional cases, the formation of 
asset classes is also accepted in practical asset allocation if diversification advantages are thereby 
lost. There is a trade-off between subdividing the investment universe into asset classes that 
reduce the degree of complexity of portfolio decisions and the transaction costs of an investment 
                                            
21  For the analysis of the ownership structures before and after the IPO, the IPO prospectuses of the 
GEX
® companies served as the source. These are only available publicly for present IPOs on the 
homepage of Deutsche Börse. Since no historical records must be kept, full coverage has not been 
possible. 90% of the IPOs in the sample took place in the boom years 1998, 1999 and 2000. 75% of 
the sample firms were initially listed in the Neue Markt.  In the distribution by industry, the 
manufacturing industry (at 17.5% in the sample vs. 33.7% in the total set) is underrepresented, while 
the media (at 9.5% in the sample vs. 1.5% in the total set) are overrepresented. The sample could 
therefore have a selection bias regarding the industry.  
22  Particularly All Share indices, the category to which the GEX
® belongs to as well as indices like the 
CDAX or the Technology All Share of Deutsche Börse, serve in the first place for measuring the 
development of all stocks of a segment or sub-segment without serving as underlying for financial 
products.  
23  On January 5, 2005, the Société Générale started with three GEX
® options and one GEX
® certificate 
followed by several more options and certificates with various issuers. As to our knowledge there are 
two options issued by Société Générale, three certificates by HSBC Trinkhaus and one certificate by 
each Société Générale and HVB available and tradable as of January, 2009. 
24  An asset class is comprised by assets which, on the one hand, have a homogenous risk-return profile 
vis-à-vis one another and, on the other hand, have a heterogeneous risk-return profile vis-à-vis other 
assets. See Bruns/Meyer/Bullerdiek (2003), p. 126. 
25  On risk diversification see the contributions on portfolio selection by Markowitz (1952), pp. 77-91, and 
Markowitz (1959). On asset allocation see e.g. Rudolph (2003), pp. 3-26. 
26  Huberman/Kandel (1987).  10
strategy on the one hand and small diversification disadvantages on the other hand. Against this 
background, two questions must be discussed: First, do entrepreneurial firms contribute notably 
to diversification and are thus entirely or in part contained in one of the K subgroups? If the 
answer is yes, then the next question is: is it appropriate to call entrepreneurial firms a separate 
asset class? Although we regard these questions mainly as avenues for further research both 
theoretically and empirically, we analyse the GEX
® with respect to risk, return and correlation to  
several other indices of Deutsche Börse in section V. 
 
III. Concept and construction of the GEX
®   
 
For the construction of the GEX
®, the problem to be solved is to distinguish the relevant firms 
(owner-managed as described in Section II, during their transition phase to becoming established 
listed companies) from the other listed companies. A sub-market – that of the entrepreneurial 
firms – is to be defined with the help of the five criteria described below. The technical aspects of 
the GEX
®, i.e. its calculation as well as the rules on chaining and to enter and exit  the index, are 




1.  The five selection criteria of the GEX
® 
 
The novelty of the GEX
® is primarily based on its particular selection criteria. There are two 
major criteria (owner dominance and post-IPO age) and three minor criteria (minimum liquidity, 
Prime Standard listing, German headquarters) to define a firm as an entrepreneurial firm and thus 
being eligible to become a GEX
® constituent.  
 
a) Owner dominance 
A company is owner dominated according to the GEX
® definition if the so-called GEX
®-relevant 
share of common stock amounts to at least 25%. 
 
     GEX
®-relevant share: This is the cumulated share ownership of the GEX
®-relevant group 
of persons in the voting stock of a company. The group includes the active members of 
the management board (and their families), active members of the supervisory board (and 
their families) as well as former members of the management and supervisory boards 
                                            
27  On the technical details of index calculation, Deutsche Börse publishes so-called index guidelines that 
describe the calculation of the indices as well as the procedures regarding special events like 




e.pdf (as of January 1, 2009).  11
(and their families).
28 It also includes indirect equity holdings of the above mentioned 
groups and imputed shares. In this context, shares are imputed if an owner-dominated 
firm owns at least 30% of shares in another firm.
29 The decision to include, besides active 
board members, also former members of the organization and family members is 
supported by the observation that former members of the organization still have 
substantial influence on “their” company after departure and the shares – not least for tax 
purposes – are often in part transferred to family members.  
       The 25% minimum threshold: The absolute size of the required GEX
®-relevant share 
cannot be conclusively explained theoretically. Requiring 25% is justified by the fact that 
25% of voting rights suffice to block certain company decisions (e.g. alteration of the 
statutes according to § 179, Section 2 AktG) and de facto – if account is taken of the fact 
that as a rule only 60% of the voting capital is represented at the general meeting
30 – also 
guarantee a substantial controlling influence on the company. Sensitivity analyses of the 
empirical data show that variations by five percentage points around the basis value of 
25% result in only relatively small changes in the number of firms fulfilling this criterion.  
 
To determine the GEX
®-relevant share, only publicly available information is used on the 




b) Maximum post-IPO age 
The ten-year ceiling regarding the post-IPO age refers to the initial quotation of the common 
stock, as no transition to a public corporation takes place by the mere issue of preferred stock and 
the growth potential remains limited.
32 In addition, the “relevant” IPO age is considered that may 
diverge from the true IPO date of the company.
33  
                                            
28 Germany has a two-tier board structure in its corporate governance system. It consists of a 
management board and a supervisory board (so called Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat) whereas the latter 
one consists of shareholder and employee representatives. While the management board is 
responsible for the decisions concerning the daily business, the supervisory board is responsible for 
appointing the members of the management board and for monitoring them. For further information on 
this, see Goergen/Manjon/Renneboog (2004), p. 13 ff. 
29  Example: Executives of company A together own 20% and company B holds 50% in company A. The 
rest, i.e. 30% is free-float. 60% of company B belong to the chairman of the supervisory board of 
company B. In this case, the GEX
®-relevant share of company A amounts to 50% (= 20% + (60% x 
50%)). The 30% ownership threshold was determined by § 35, Section 2 WpÜG, that prescribes the 
mandatory preparation and publication of an acquisition offer if the marginal limit is exceeded.   
30  Research by Baums/Fraune is based on a 1992 study of general meetings of the 24 biggest German 
corporations. See Baums/Fraune (1995), pp. 97 ff. 
31  On the particularities and on the suitability of these data sources regarding the composition of German 
shareholders see Bott (2002), pp. 172-240.  
32  According to § 139 Section 2 AktG, preferred stock may be issued at the nominal value of the common 
stock at a maximum.   
33  If, for example, a firm chooses to be listed via the acquisition of an empty corporate shell, the point in 
time at which the active firm is entered into the shell is considered the relevant IPO date. The merger of 
two companies (of which at least one is already listed) into a newly founded company means that the 
IPO date of the already listed (dominant) company is used as the relevant date.  12
 
c) Minimum liquidity 
The introduction of the first minor criterion “minimum liquidity” serves to filter out those firms 
that do fulfil the two major criteria but do not fit the type of entrepreneurial firm described. 
Companies that are almost exclusively in the hands of the GEX
®-relevant group of persons do 
not, as a rule, enter a very expansive growth phase, as the sale of minority shares can only result 
in a limited injection of equity capital, or they rely primarily on other kinds of capital (e.g. debt). 
The ceiling for the maximum permitted GEX
®-relevant share is fixed at a flat 75%.
34 Here, 
sensitivity analyses show that variations by five percentage points around the threshold value of 
75% cause only relatively small changes in the number of firms fulfilling this criterion.  
 
It should further be noted that this criterion also plays an important part in connection with the 
theoretical remarks of Section II.1. There it was pointed out that an increase in the share 
ownership of company executives can have negative results if it causes a majority/minority 
shareholder conflict. The latter may certainly be expected if the majority shareholder owns shares 
that exceed the blocking minority threshold of 25%. Additionally, according to German stock 
corporation law, a super majority level of 75% is required to change a firm’s charter.
35 Therefore, 
this ceiling also makes sense from this point of view.  
 
d) Prime Standard listing 
The second minor criterion requires that the common stock of a GEX
® company is listed in the 
Prime Standard of the Frankfurt stock exchange. To highlight the implications of this restriction 
we would like to give some background information on the stock market segmentation in 
Germany. In a first step, the German stock market can be divided into the regulated unofficial 
market (Open Market) which captures all listings regulated by the stock operators itself and the 
official market legally regulated by the European Union. The latter one in turn is divided into two 
market segments which differ in terms of transparency requirements by Deutsche Börse: The 
General Standard with lower transparency requirements and the Prime Standard with higher 
                                            
34  In addition, companies, which are shortly to be delisted or squeezed out by an owner-dominated parent 
company, are not to be included in the GEX
®.  This is to guarantee the ability to invest in firms 
contained in the GEX
®. Since this criterion is to safeguard a certain minimum liquidity, the directly held 
share as well as the calculated share must be below the 75% ceiling. 
35 Thresholds exceeding 75% are also called a ‘qualified’ majority. See Gorton/Schmid (2000), p.31, or 
Becht/Röll (1999), p. 1055.  13
transparency requirements.
36 The restriction of GEX
® companies to be listed in the Prime 
Standard is explained as follows: 
   Shareholder composition data are available from various sources in Germany.
37 Comparing 
these reveals in part substantial differences that cannot always be explained by further 
research. Because of their higher visibility, Prime Standard companies have better quality 
data than General Standard companies. 
  The transparency requirements for listed companies are highest in the Prime Standard. By 
limiting GEX
® companies to those in the Prime Standard, it is emphasized that these are 
companies for which investors benefit from the advantages of highest listing and 
transparency requirements.  
 
e) German headquarters 
As the third and last minor criterion, all GEX
® companies must have their headquarters in 
Germany. This geographic restriction is chosen because it is the performance of entrepreneurial 
firms headquartered in Germany that is to be presented. This corresponds to the geographic 
delineation chosen, for example, by Deutsche Börse for the DAX. 
 




® , as for all stock indices of Deutsche Börse, the weight of the individual stock in 
the index is determined by their market capitalization, with only the free-float share counting, i.e. 
the share of freely tradable stocks
38. Furthermore, the weight of a single stock is limited to a 
maximum of 10%. As index formula for calculation at time t, a quarterly chained Laspeyres 
formula is used  
                                            
36  Firms in the General Standard have to fulfil the minimum requirements for EU-regulated markets, such 
as IFRS-reporting, disclosure of director dealings’, ad hoc disclosure, compliance with disclosure of 
ownership stakes beyond legally defined control thresholds according to Wertpapierhandelsgesetz 
(WpHG) or compliance with mandatory takeover-bid rules according to Wertpapiererwerbs- und 
Übernahmegesetz (WpÜG). In addition to these minimum requirements, Prime Standard firms are, for 
example, required to report company news in English language, publish quarterly reports in German 
and English language, record a company calendar in the internet and organise at least one analyst 
conference per year. For further information on the German stock market segments as well as its 
different legal transparency requirements, refer to the online publication by Deutsche Börse, General 
und Prime Standard – Zugang zum europäischen Kapitalmarkt, http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/de/binary/gdb_content_pool/imported_files/public_files/10_downloads/33_g
oing_being_public/40_stock_market_segmentation/sm_rcm_broschuere.pdf (as of January 1, 2009). 
37 Besides the database on important voting right shares, run by the Federal Financial Services 
Supervisory Authority (Bafin), based on the statutory provisions of § 21 ff. WpHG, information on 
shareholder composition is also offered by private providers (e.g. Hoppenstedt Aktienführer). 
Furthermore, some annual reports also contain data on shareholder composition, albeit in very different 
amount of detail.  
38 The free-float share is calculated as the difference between total shares and those owned by major 
stockholders. On the definition of free float see Deutsche Börse online publication cited in fn 25, p. 14 f.  14
 
where KT is the index specific chaining factor from time T, T is the time of the previous chaining, 
Pit (or pio) is the price of stock i at time t (or the final price of stock i on the trading day before the 
first trading inclusion in an index), qiT (or qio) is the number of underlying stocks of company i at 
time T (or the number of stocks of company i on the trading day before the first trading inclusion 
in an index), ffiT is the free-float factor of type i at time T, cit are the present correction factors of 
company i at time t, n is the number of stocks in the index and on base 1000, which for the GEX
® 
was set at July 7, 2004. 
The GEX
® is calculated as a performance and as a price index. Whereas the former measures 
performance in terms of total return, i.e. potential income from dividend and premium payments 
are reinvested in the index portfolio (“operation blanche”), the latter calculates the true price 
changes, only taking account of corrections for income from stock purchase warrants and special 
payments. The technical GEX
® regulations (e.g. regarding exactness of the calculations, 
adjustments, capital increases and reductions, readjustments of the nominal value, etc.) 
correspond to the regulations for the other indices of Deutsche Börse and are therefore not 
considered in detail here.
39  
 
3. Updatings and chaining rules 
 
Usually, the composition of selection indices is readjusted in regular intervals, quarterly in the 
case of the selection indices of Deutsche Börse, in order to guarantee that the index fulfils e.g. its 
information function with an always representative index portfolio. The readjustment is 
combined with a chaining
40 in the respective index formula and is done at the DAX futures 
expiry dates (the third Friday of the end-of-the-quarter month). In contrast, for benchmark 
indices the readjustments are done at the end of each day, as the number of companies in the 
index is not restricted.  
The composition of the GEX
® is adjusted only quarterly corresponding to the selection indices. 
This restriction is necessary because the criteria (see Section IV.2) cannot be reviewed on a daily 
basis. Instead, whether index and non-index companies are fulfilling the GEX
® criteria is 
checked on a key date that is about seven weeks before the next chaining date. Since the GEX
® 
criteria refer to dynamic company characteristics (ownership structure and age), there is a 
continuous need for readjustment. Here, the hybrid character of the GEX
® becomes evident: On 
the one hand the number of stocks is not limited (analogously to the benchmark indices), on the 
other hand readjustments are done only quarterly at known dates (analogously to selection 
                                            
39 Deutsche Börse online publication cited in fn 25, pp. 31-39. 
40 Deutsche Börse online publication cited in fn 25, pp. 39-41.  15
indices). The continuity and transparency of the index composition, which is thus guaranteed, 
lets the range of usage exceed the pure information and benchmarking function.  
 
 
4. The German index family of Deutsche Börse 
 
Selection and benchmark indices 
 In its role as market organizer of security trading, Deutsche Börse calculates selection as well as 
benchmark stock indices. Besides the well known DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX (so-called 
selection indices), it also calculates expanded selection indices (such as HDAX and MID-CAP-
Market index) and all-share or benchmark indices (such as CDAX, Prime, Technology, and 
Classic All-Share). In the selection indices, the number of index members is limited in order to 
guarantee a high degree of tradability. Benchmark indices do not limit the number of index 
members and therefore measure, on a broad base, the performance of a market (e.g. CDAX), of a 




® into the index landscape of Deutsche Börse 
By definition, selection indices only represent samples of the entire set of listed firms. The 
selection procedure is therefore of prime importance. Selected are the biggest corporations of a 
market (e.g. in the DAX the 30 biggest companies of the classical and technology industries) or 
sub-markets (e.g. in the MDAX the 50 biggest companies of the classical industries below the 
DAX), according to their market capitalization and the size of their order books. It should be 
noted that the selection – aside from the industry division – is done purely according to size, 
which is to be considered endogenous to the trading. In contrast, the benchmark indices are 
divided into 18 industries or two branches of industries, respectively (i.e. classical and 
technological). There is no further selection of index members.  
 
In the GEX
®, criteria of owner dominance and post-IPO age are defined as index-relevant for the 
first time. Thus, firm-specific characteristics, which are not revealed by the listing as such, are 
used in the construction of an index for the first time. Because of this special feature the 
development of the criteria as well as the regular examination of the composition of the index are 
done every quarter by the Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS) at the 
Technische Universität München as an independent scientific institution. The use of qualitative 
characteristics is necessary in order to filter out the so-called entrepreneurial firms (see Section 
II) from the entire set of listed companies. Thus, the GEX
® is a hybrid between a selection and a 
benchmark index: On the one hand, the relevant total set is limited in a selection process with the 
help of qualitative criteria, on the other hand, all companies that fulfil the criteria are included in 
the GEX
®.
41  The following section now shows characteristics of listed entrepreneurial firms in 
the index and how the index composition has changed over time. 
                                            
41 Examples of other share indices containing qualitative selection criteria are the Sustainability indices 
and Islamic Market indices published by Dow Jones.   16
IV. Changes in the index composition over time 
 
This section shows how the GEX
® index composition has developed over time in the first four 
years of its existence. Thereby, we refer to the time horizon in this section between January 3, 
2005, and June 24, 2008: the date of index inception and the latest reference point of the analysis 
in this section, shortly after the re-weighting of the index for Q3 2008. Hence, if we use the terms 
Q1 2005 and Q3 2008, we refer to the starting of points of the respective quarter.
42 
 
1. Number of entries and exits 
During the four years of existence of the index there have been cumulative 56 entries and 69 
exits of constituents. This led to an absolute decrease of the number of constituents from 117 
down to 104. Figure 3 even confirms a steady decrease quarter over quarter. This fact gives rise 
to the question what is driving this development. 
 
Figure 3: Total number of GEX



























A split of the total numbers mentioned above shows that the main reason for entries was 29 new 
IPOs in the German Prime Standard relevant for the GEX
®, representing about 52% of total 
GEX
® entries. This is followed by 17 (about 30%) entries due to changes in the GEX
®-relevant 
                                            
42  For the exact dates of the quarterly re-weightings of the index see Deutsche Börse, Leitfaden zum 
German Entrepreneurial Index GEX der Deutschen Börse, http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/de/binary/gdb_content_pool/imported_files/public_files/10_downloads/50_in
formations_services/30_Indices_Index_Licensing/21_guidelines/10_share_indices/gex_guide.pdf (as 
of January 1, 2009).  17
shareholder structure and 12 entries (about 21%) due to transfers into the German Prime 
Standard.
43 
The main reason for its exits was 51 (about 74% of all exits) companies of which their GEX
®-
relevant share dropped below the minimum 25% or exceeded the maximum 75% threshold. This 




Theses statistics show that the main driver for GEX
® entries since its inception was new IPOs 
and less so changes in the owner dominated share or transfers into the Prime Standard. This is 
opposite to the main reasons for GEX
® exits. Most of the exits were driven by non-fulfillment of 
the GEX
®-relevant owner dominance criterion rather than by non-fulfillment of the maximum 
post-IPO age of ten years. Simulations have shown that a continuing lack of new IPOs in the 
German Prime Standard would ceteris paribus represent a major reason for a further decreasing 
number of GEX
® constituents.  
A possible indication on the future development of the German IPO market is the IPO-
Sentiment-Indicator (ISI).
45 The value of December 2008 is the second-lowest since inception of 
the indicator in March 2005 and thus gives no reason to assume a more active primary market in 
Germany within the near future. Another reason besides fewer IPOs – a declining number of 
GEX
® constituents – is shown by a more detailed analysis of the constituents’ post-IPO age. 
 
2. Post-IPO age 
Figure 4a) clearly shows that the average post-IPO age of the GEX
® constituents has 
continuously increased since inception of the index. This is due to a changing cross-section 










                                            
43 Two entries were due to adjustments of the GEX
®-relevant IPO date in Q2 2005: for the Fielmann AG 
from the IPO date of its preferred stocks to the IPO date of its common stocks, for the Marseille-
Kliniken AG from the IPO date of its acquired corporate shell to the first day of being listed as 
Marseille-Kliniken AG. For details on this issue see fn. 35,  
44 One exit was due to a delisting in Q2 2006. 
45 The ISI is a mood barometer for the primary market developed by Deutsche Börse joint with Prof. 
Kaserer (CEFS). It consists of two components, namely the IPO climate and the perceived 
underpricing. It is published quarterly and expressed in a point value. For further information see 
http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/de/kir/gdb_navigation/listing/20_Going_Public/03_I-
POint/59_IPO_Sentiment (as of January 1, 2009).  18




























Cross-section distribution of GEX

































2008 2005  
Whereas in 2005 more than 75% of all GEX
® firms have an IPO age between five and six years, 
the distribution becomes more left-skewed over time. In fact, in 2008 more than 65% of the 
constituents are listed for at least eight years. Germany experienced a boom period of IPO 
activity during 1998 and 2000 when many firms went public at the so called ‘Neuer Markt’ – a 
                                            
46  Q3 2005 refers to the index weighting as of June 24, 2005, Q3 2008 refers to the index weighting as of 
June 24, 2008.  19
special market segment for high-technology companies.
47 Not surprisingly, the majority of GEX
® 
firms went public during this booming IPO-period. Hence, many GEX
® companies with a post-
IPO age of 5 to 7 years in 2005 continue to be index members through 2008. They still represent 
the major part of GEX
® constituents three years later – now with a post-IPO age ranging between 
8 and 10 years.  
In general, the distribution of post-IPO age is related to the cyclical nature of stock exchange 
activity.
48 The fact that the GEX
® hardly contains any firms with a post-IPO age of 5 to 7 years is 
partly due to an almost inactive German IPO-market in the years following the burst of the high-
tech bubble (in the years 2002 and 2003).
49 About 25% of all GEX
® firms have a post-IPO age of 
one to four years in 2008 and reflect the more active IPO market in the German regulated market 
between the four years 2004 and 2007 with a total number of 91 IPOs during that time frame. In 
contrast within the four years of 1998 through 2001 before the burst of the hight-tech bubble 
there were a total number of 494 IPOs which underlines the cyclicity of stock markets.
 50   
The fact that the absolute level of IPO-activity is low relative to other countries is related to the 
financial system and corporate governance in Germany. The German stock market can be seen as 
a rather underdeveloped market compared to other ones, especially the Anglo-American stock 
markets. In this context Morck/Steier (2003) also refer to the German corporate governance 
system as bank capitalism in contrast to shareholder, family or state capitalism observed in other 
countries.
51 The reason for this is that German firms are historically more bank financed than 
firms e.g. in the US. These two countries can even be considered as the two extremes of bank 
oriented vs. capital market oriented financial systems.
52 Numerically this is underlined by a 
market capitalization relative to the GDP of only 67.8% in Germany and 181.8% in the US. But 
even within Europe the German level of market capitalization is low compared to France (103%) 
and the UK (203.4%).
53 The low level of market capitalization is also reflected in the absolute 
number of IPOs within Europe. A study by Kaserer/Schiereck (2008)
54 compares the IPO activity 
of the three major European stock exchanges, Deutsche Börse, Euronext and London Stock 
Exchange between 01.01.2005 and 31.03.2008. The authors show that the EUR 18.69bn raised 
                                            
47  The public statistics by Deutsche Börse report 84 IPOs in 1998, 204 IPOs in 1999 and 179 IPOs in 
2000 for the whole German regulated market (Regulierter Markt). 
48  It is a well-known fact that stock market activity – both for initial and seasoned public offerings – is 
highly cyclical, see. e.g. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) or Lowry and Schwert (2002).  
49  The public statistics by Deutsche Börse report 7 IPOs in 2002 and 1 IPO in 2003 for the whole German 
regulated market. 
50  The public statistics by Deutsche Börse are reported for the whole German regulated market which is 
equivalent to the then introduced General and Prime Standard since 2003.  
51  Morck/Steier (2003), pp. 5 ff. 
52  Antoniou/Guney/Paudyal (2009), pp. 5 f. 
53  The data are from 1999 collected by the World Bank, see also Antoniou/Guney/Paudyal (2009), p. 31. 
54   Kaserer/Schiereck (2008), p.16  20
through 135 IPOs at Deutsche Börse
55 were by far outnumbered by EUR 40.975bn (EUR 
55.752bn) through 206 (183) transactions at Euronext (London Stock Exchange).  
Summing up for the case of the GEX
® index, the stock exchange development might give some 
explanation for the level of IPOs in Germany relevant for GEX
® entries. As for the GEX
® exits, 
the look at the post-IPO age of the GEX
® constituents shows that ceteris paribus within the next 
3 years 65% of the current GEX
® constituents will exit the index due to non-fulfillment of the 10 
years post-IPO criterion. A full compensation for this through new GEX
®-relevant IPOs – the 
reason for most of the new entries so far – would be unlikely given the historical levels of new 
IPOs in Germany as well as the current market outlook. 
 
3. Concentration data and industry weightings 
In contrast to the average post-IPO age, the index concentration in terms of market capitalization 
of constituents has been almost unchanged between 2005 and 2008: Nevertheless, in comparison 
to all other main stock indices in Germany, the GEX
® remains the index with the highest degree 
of concentration.
56 This concentration shows that the largest share of market capitalization in the 
index is accumulated on a few large entities, besides many relatively small companies contained 
in the index. This underlines the goal of the index to capture entrepreneurial firms within the first 
10 years after its IPO. By nature, owner-dominated firms are usually smaller in terms of market 
capitalization than widely held firms so that large companies such as the German multinational 
software company SAP are rather the exception than the rule within the German Entrepreneurial 
Index. 
 
Insert Figure 5 about here. 
 
Although the concentration in terms of size remained basically unchanged between 2005 and 
2008, there can be seen a clear change in terms of the index industry weightings. The sector 
Industrial
57 gained weighting from about 30% to about 45%. Whereas in 2005 the second to sixth 
largest sectors in terms of index weighting summed up to about 63% of the index weighting, they 
                                            
55  In this study Kaserer/Schiereck have counted all IPOs (including issues declared as a mix of an IPO 
and a placing) - occurred within this timeframe. The numbers are aggregated for the small and large 
cap market, which in the case of Deutsche Börse corresponds to the Open Market and Entry Standard 
as well as the Prime / General Standard. 
56  These indices are DAX containing 30 blue chips, MDAX containing 50 midcaps, SDAX containing 50 
smallcaps and TecDAX containing 30 Technology midcaps. All of these indices including the GEX
®are 
contained in the German Prime Standard segment. On the Prime Standard listing refer to section 
III.1.d), for further information on the German indices mentioned, see Deutsche Börse, Short 
Information to the Equity- and Strategy Indices of Deutsche Börse http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/de/binary/gdb_content_pool/imported_files/public_files/10_downloads/50_in
formations_services/30_Indices_Index_Licensing/21_guidelines/10_share_indices/equity_indices_info.
pdf (as of January 1, 2009). 
57  The sector classification used here follows the classification by Deutsche Börse. For further information 
see Deutsche Börse, Leitfaden zu den Aktienindizes der Deutschen Börse, p. 44 – 46, http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/de/binary/gdb_content_pool/imported_files/public_files/10_downloads/50_in
formations_services/30_Indices_Index_Licensing/21_guidelines/10_share_indices/equity_indices_guid
e.pdf (as of January 1, 2009).  21
sum up to about 46% in 2008 loosing their weighting in favor of the Industrial sector. This shows 
the increasing concentration of GEX
® constituents on the sector Industrial between 2005 and 
2008. 
 
Insert Figure 6 about here. 
 
It should be stated though, that the German economy as a whole is dominated by automotive 
manufacturers and connected industries which are part of the sector Industrial. Since this sector 
also includes additional sub-sectors which range from Containers & Packaging to Industrial 
Machinery and Renewable Energies as defined by Deutsche Börse,
58 the GEX
® cross-section 
distribution as shown here is not surprising in a German All Share index with respect to the 
German industry structure as stated above. This trend towards an increasing weighting of the 
sector Industrial within the GEX
® is also displayed in the overall IPO statistic provided by 
Kaserer/Schiereck (2008). They show that the largest IPO volume in the overall German market 
occurred in the Industrial Goods & Services and Chemicals sector during 2005 and 2008.
59 As 
stated before, new IPOs count for most of the constituents’ entries into the GEX
® and thus are 
one driving factor for an increasing index concentration on the sector Industrial which most of 
the IPOs stem from. 
Kaserer/Schiereck (2008) also show that during that time frame about 98% of the equity volume 
raised in the sub-sector Alternative Energies
60 aggregated from the major European stock 
exchanges Deutsche Börse, Euronext and London Stock Exchange has been raised at the German 
Deutsche Börse amounting altogether to EUR 1.5bn.
61 This underlines the importance of 
alternative energy as a newly established growth industry in Germany. A prominent example 
from the sector Industrial and sub-sector Renewable Energies and contained in the GEX
® is the 
Solarworld AG with an index weighting of about 10% and a market capitalization of about EUR 
1.96bn as of 24.06.2008. The manufacturer in the field of solar technology was founded in 1998 
and today employs more than 2,000 people worldwide. The production covers the whole supply 
chain of solar modules from production to sales of the commodity silicon to turnkey solar 
modules. Within the sector Chemicals, Wacker Chemie AG is a prominent example. It is a 
manufacturer in the fields of semiconductors, silicon and special chemicals as well as 
biotechnology. It has plants in Germany, the US and Asia. In the GEX
® it has an index weighting 
of about 10%. An example from the sector Software is the Software AG which was founded in 
1969 and is offering business software solutions. It currently employs 3,600 employees in 70 
                                            
58  The sector Industrial includes the following sub-sectors: Advanced Industrial Equipment, Containers & 
Packaging, Heavy Machinery, Industrial Machinery, Industrial Diversified, Renewable Energies, 
Industrial Products & Services. 
59 Kaserer/Schiereck (2008), p. 17 f.; the sector classification here follows ICB classification 
(www.icbbenchmark.com), whereas figure 6 uses the Deutsche Börse classification (see page 18 for 
more information on this classification). Although not identical, we think that both classifications are 
similar enough to be compared to each other. 
60 The sector Alternative Energies is compromised by the sub-sectors Renewable Energy Equipment 
(0583) and Alternative Fuels (0587) according to the ICB classification. 
61  Kaserer / Schiereck (2008), p. 18.  22
countries and had a turnover of EUR 621mn in 2007. It is represented in the GEX
® with a 
weighting of 6.9%. An example of the sector Retail is represented by the Fielmann AG. It 
manufactures glasses and runs its own branch network through which it is market leader in terms 
of sales of optical devices in Germany. In 2007 the group employed around 11,900 employees 
and yielded a turnover of EUR 839mn. Currently it has a GEX
® index weight of about 5%. KWS 
Saat AG is a smaller company out of the sector Industrial and sub-sector Industrial Products & 
Services. Despite its recent IPO this company has a long history being founded in 1856. Today it 
is specialized on the cultivation and development of crop and grain seeds. As one of the smaller 
GEX






®-relevant share, one of the GEX
® criteria mentioned in section III 1a), is also 
connected to the German corporate governance system. As for the index, the 25% minimum and 
75% maximum threshold of the GEX
®-relevant share are the boundaries for a company to fulfill 
the GEX
® criteria. By nature, if calculating a cross-sectional average of GEX
®-relevant shares 
over all GEX
® constituents, this average lies within this range at each point of time. Figure 7 
shows, that this has been the case at a relatively high level of between 45% and 50%.  
 
Figure 7: Average total GEX



































Figure 8 compares the cross-sectional distribution of the GEX
®-relevant share of the GEX
® 
constituents in Q3 2005 and Q3 2008. It shows that at both points of time the whole range of the 
GEX
®-relevant ownership share between 25% and 75% is covered as well as that the majority of 
GEX
® companies (around 70%) display such ownership levels between 25% and 55% – i.e. 
between the threshold which entitles to block certain company decisions and around the 50%  23
majority,
62 which according to the German stock corporation law is the threshold for most of the 
shareholder votes at the general meeting. However, in 2008 the distribution became less evenly 
distributed with a concentration of GEX
®-relevant ownership share around the 50% majority (i.e. 
within the 45%-55% percentile).  
 
Insert Figure 8 about here. 
 
Putting these levels of ownership into the context of corporate governance it displays some 
typical properties of ownership structures in Germany and their implications on voting power and 
control. The observed ownership structures are in line with the previous findings in the academic 
literature, that in general ownership concentration is much higher in continental Europe than e.g. 
in the US. Becht/Röll (1999) report in their study, that the median of the largest voting stake in 
listed companies is in Germany amongst other European countries over 50% and that in no 
European country this falls below 5% – which is the case for the US.
63 These findings are 
reflected in the levels of the average GEX
®-relevant ownership share between 45% and 50%. 
Besides the high concentration of ownership structures in Germany, it is also shown that in 
Germany voting blocks are clearly aligned with important control thresholds.
64 These are the 
25% threshold for the blocking minority or the 75% threshold required to change a company’s 
charter. As outlined in section III.1., these are the boundaries for the GEX
®-relevant ownership 
shares. The simple majority of 50% is another important control threshold with which voting 
rights are clearly aligned. As for the GEX
® companies, the prominent status of this threshold is 
reflected in the cross-section distribution of figure 8 as well as in the average GEX
®-relevant 
share between 45% and 50% shown in figure 7. Given that on average only about 60% of the 
voting capital is represented at the general meetings in Germany as mentioned before, this level 
of shareholder voting power de facto clearly exceeds the 50% majority at a general meeting.  
Considering the finding mentioned above, the level as well as the distribution of the GEX
®-
relevant shares observed imply a substantial influence on the GEX
® companies by its insider 
owners. As documented in academic literature, this is in line with the overall ownership structure 







                                            
62  50% plus one vote or ‘simple majority’, see Gorton/Schmid (2000), p. 37. 
63 Becht/Röll (1999), pp.1051 ff. Several other empirical studies show similar findings in terms of 
ownership concentration, see amongst others LaPorta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Shleifer (1999), Köke (2001), 
Faccio/Lang (2002) or just recently Franks/Mayer/Volpin/Wagner (2008). 
64  Becht/Böhmer (2003), pp. 10 ff.  24
V. Performance and correlation analysis  
 
Having mainly talked about corporate governance aspects of the GEX
® companies we now turn 




Insert Figure 9 about here. 
 
Figure 9 shows that since inception on January 5, 2005, the GEX
® exhibited a significant 
cumulative outperformance through Q3 2007 compared to all major German stock indices 
considered here. In comparison to these indices the GEX
® underperformed in 2008 in a way that 
the cumulative outperformance at year-end of 2008 decreased and the cumulative performance 
dropped even below the DAX.
66 Nevertheless, the cumulative performance at year end 2008 
remains second highest amongst them and underlines the benchmark and information function 
for the young and insider-dominated GEX
® firms in a changing stock market environment. 
 
Table 1: Risk and return data of daily returns 
01.01.05 - 31.12.08
GEX DAX MDAX SDAX TecDAX CDAX
Average 0,0001 0,0001 0,0000 -0,0001 0,0000 0,0001
annualized 0,0274 0,0310 0,0103 -0,0284 -0,0056 0,0240
Max. Loss -0,1134 -0,0716 -0,0866 -0,0718 -0,1127 -0,0727
Std Dev 0,0169 0,0142 0,0153 0,0125 0,0176 0,0137
Volatility 0,2724 0,2284 0,2469 0,2015 0,2846 0,2210  
 
Table 1 confirms these properties with an annualised daily return of 3.10% for the DAX followed 
by 2.74% for the GEX
® and between -2.84% and 2.40% for the other indices. Table 1 indicates 
that the GEX
® also incorporates an above-average risk profile: With 11.34% it shows the highest 
maximum daily loss, with 1.69% the second highest standard deviation of daily return and an 
annualised volatility of 27.24%. All these three risk figures are close to the ones exhibited by the 
TecDAX containing 30 Technology midcaps (11.27% maximum loss, 1.76% standard deviation 







                                            
65  Performance (price) index data can also be accessed using the ISIN DE000A0AER17       
   (DE000A0AER09), the Bloomberg ticker GEX (GEXK) or the Reuters ticker GEXIR (GEXI). 
66  As of 31.12.2008 the cumulative performance of the indices are (in descending order): DAX +12.09%, 
GEX +10.37%, MDAX +3.29%, TecDAX -3.98%, SDAX -10.64%.  25
Table 2: Correlation matrix of daily returns 
01.01.05 - 31.12.08
GEX DAX MDAX SDAX TecDAX CDAX
GEX 1
DAX 0,777109161 1
MDAX 0,896987144 0,836301374 1
SDAX 0,887911046 0,746159392 0,886117771 1
TecDAX 0,952729574 0,783697933 0,880275095 0,845008304 1
CDAX 0,821604132 0,994947957 0,878924652 0,794176319 0,825079665 1  
 
Insert tables 2a) through 2d) about here. 
 
The similarities of risk and return data also question as to what extent the daily returns of the 
peer indices correlate with each other. In the first step a correlation analysis over the whole time 
period from index inception through 31.12.2008 in table 2 shows that the daily GEX
® returns 
have the highest correlation with the daily TecDAX returns being about 0.95 and the lowest 
correlation with the daily DAX returns being about 0.78. One reason for this is that as of Q3 
2008 there are no firms being listed in the GEX
® and DAX at the same time, but 28 firms listed 
in the GEX
® and TecDAX at the same time representing altogether about 21% of the GEX
® 
index weight. 
Comparing the correlation between the GEX
® and the TecDAX for each calendar year from 2005 
through 2008, tables 2a) through 2d) show that the correlation steadily increased starting from 
about 0.82 in 2005 and amounting to 0.96 in 2008. This tendency of increasing return correlation 
year–over-year can also be confirmed in a continuous setting. Figure 9 shows the rolling 12-
months correlations between daily GEX
® returns with each of the peer indices. Interestingly, 
each correlation has increased over time between 2005 and 2008. Additionally, the highest level 
of correlation is given between the GEX
® and TecDAX. Since about Q2 2006, it also remains 
remarkably stable around 0.95.  
 
Insert Figure 9 about here. 
 
Like the high level of correlation as stated above, the development of increasing correlation over 
time can be explained by the development of constituents in both indices: in 2005 there were 7 
firms cross-listed in both indices representing 9.72% of the GEX
® index weight. Although the 
pure number of cross-listed firms remains constant over time, their index weight in the GEX
® has 
significantly increased. In 2008 the 7 cross-listed firms represent 29.18% of the GEX
® index 
weight, three times as much as in 2005. The same explanation for an increasing correlation to the 
GEX
® over time can be given for the MDAX and SDAX, where the index weight of cross-listed 
firms in the GEX
® has about doubled during that time.
67 
                                            
67  In 2005 there were 5 (11) firms cross-listed in GEX and MDAX (SDAX), representing 9.2% (13.17%) of 
the GEX index weight. In 2008 there were 2 (12) firms cross-listed in GEX and MDAX (SDAX), 
representing 16.93% (30.92%) of the GEX index weight.  26
Nevertheless, two open questions remain: One point is that the correlation between the TecDAX 
and GEX
® has by far the highest level amongst all indices considered, although exhibiting the 
second highest level of weighted cross-listed firms in the GEX
®. This gives rise to the 
assumption that there are other factors, too, driving the high level of this correlation such as a 
specifically similar sector exposure. Even more obvious, although there have not been any firms 
cross-listed in GEX
® and DAX, the correlation has similarly increased over time as it did to the 
other indices. This questions additionally the quick assumption that the increasingly converting 
set of constituents – and thus converting sector exposure – is the only reason for the increasing 
correlation between the GEX
®. Studies show that correlations between stock markets have 
shifted considerably over time and do not exhibit a constant correlation structure.
68 Several 
empirical studies even find evidence that correlations between stock markets are higher in bear 
markets than they are in bull markets.
69 
Although we have considered national as opposed to international indices here, similar 
phenomenon might have influenced the increasing correlation between the indices, especially 
during the bull markets of 2007 – 2008. Nevertheless, this remains an assumption which needs to 
be further analysed. The analysis of the bi-partial correlations above have shown so far, that the 
GEX
® shares most similarities in terms of risk and return with the TecDAX. From that point of 
view also it is not surprising that the GEX
®shows the highest correlation with the TecDAX. 
Another possibility to show this in a non-bi-partial setting is to replicate the GEX
® with other 
German indices (DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX) in a way that the tracking error is 
minimized. Hereby, the tracking error was minimized by investing in three out of the four indices 
(DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX). The result confirms the findings provided so far: In the 
time frame 03.01.2005 through 31.12.2008 the GEX
® exhibits patterns quite similar to the 
TecDAX. In this replication analysis this is expressed by a weighted portfolio of 65% TecDAX, 












                                            
68 For changing correlation structure between international stock markets and further literature review on 
this see Goetzmann/Li/Rouwenhorst (2005). 
69  See Longin/Solnik (2001) or Ang/Bekaert (2002).  27
VI. Summary and conclusion  
 
This article has introduced the concept of an ownership-based style index for Germany. The 
German Entrepreneurial Index is motivated by (i) the assumption that agency costs are lower in 
owner-dominated than in widely-held firms and (ii) empirical evidence that shareholder structure 
matters for corporate performance. Hence, the Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies 
(CEFS) at Technische Universität München in cooperation with the Deutsche Börse has 
developed the German Entrepreneurial Index. The Index tracks the performance of recently 
listed, owner-dominated companies in the German Prime Standard. Thereby, it fulfils several 
functions commonly associated with stock indices: (i) an information function, (ii) a benchmark 
function and to a certain degree (iii) a trading function.  
 
We provide a descriptive analysis of the index composition over the first four years of its 
existence and analyze past performance and correlation of the GEX
® in relation to other stock 
indices in Germany. While the majority of new entrants are owner-dominated IPOs, the (i) 
dispersion of ownership over time and (ii) to a much lesser degree the non-fulfillment of the 
post-IPO age of ten years are the two main reasons for firms exiting the GEX
®. A study of index 
performance can show that – over the comparatively short period of time – the GEX
® 
outperformed other German stock indices. Interestingly, the GEX
® has a similar risk-return 
profile as the TecDAX, an index of technology stocks. Not surprisingly, the correlation of daily 
stock returns among all indices is the highest between the GEX
® and the TecDax. In addition, we 
see that the performance and correlation of daily stock returns converges among all indices over 
time.   
 
Our analysis of index composition indicates that the majority of GEX
® firms have currently a 
post-IPO age between 8 and 10 years. Hence, it is obvious that the bulk of GEX
® firms will leave 
the index in the years to come. To maintain the GEX
® with a sufficient number of index firms, 
initial public offerings in the Prime Standard should regain momentum. Against the background 
of the current economic situation with the financial crisis and a bad worldwide IPO climate it is 
however unclear how long it would take until a sufficient number of entrepreneurial firms will 
again go public on the German stock market. 
 
Regarding the future of this index one has to bear in mind that although small and mid-sized 
enterprises (sometimes also called family firms) are the backbone of the German economy
70, 
many owners (founders) are often not willing to give up control over their firms.
71 Hence, family 
firms in Germany so far largely avoid outside equity financing via stock exchanges. 
                                            
70  According to the Institut für Mittelstandsforschung (ifm), SMEs in Germany account for 42% of total 
sales and 57% of total employment. 
71 For example, Villalonga/Amit (2008) argue that founding families use pyramid structures, dual-class 
shares, voting agreements and disproportional board representation to retain control rights in excess of 
their cash-flow rights in large U.S. listed firms.   28
Nevertheless, outside equity can provide a useful alternative especially to finance growth options 
and investment projects or solve succession problems in family businesses. In the years to come, 
restricted lending due to the financial crisis can create additional financing shortage in 
Germany’s traditionally bank-orientated financial system. 
 
Against this background, the German Entrepreneuial Index can potentially contribute to 
overcoming the psychological obstacles of control loss by increasing the visibility of 
entrepreneurial firms for investors, analysts and the public. In addition, it offers a benchmark for 
potential new lists both from the portfolio of private equity firms and for private family firms. 
The fact, that shortly after introduction of the GEX
® there has been introduced the Swiss 
Entrepreneurial Index (SEX
®) with a similar concept of the index construction, shows also the 
high relevance of such a topic outside of Germany, too.
72 However, without the willingness of 
founders and dominant owners to disperse their ownership and control rights and provide 
company information to the public, better utilisation of stock market financing in Germany is 
impossible. Hence, it is questionable to what extent elements of a market-based financial system 




                                            
72  For more information on the SEX
® and its comparison to the GEX
® see Achleitner/Ampenberger (2006.)  29
Figure 5: Concentration of the GEX
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Figure 8: Cross-section distribution of GEX
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Figure 9: Relative performance of GEX



































































































Figure 9: Rolling 12-months correlations of daily GEX
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